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 1 
The Strange Death of Blasphemy 
Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe * 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Tucked away in Part 5 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, amid a 
plethora of provisions affecting various parts of the criminal law,1 can be found one 
line that ends a long-running debate in England and Wales about the future of the 
blasphemy laws. Section 79(1) states that: ‘The offences of blasphemy and 
blasphemous libel under the common law of England and Wales are abolished’.   
Although many had already pronounced the offence of blasphemy dead, 2 or at least 
moribund,3  the abolition of these ancient offences in such an understated way has 
caught many by surprise.4  The purpose of this article is to explain what has been lost, 
to explore why blasphemy has been abolished now and to examine the extent to which 
the criminal law still nevertheless protects religious beliefs and believers.  
                                                 
*
 Russell Sandberg is Lecturer in Law and Norman Doe is Professor of Law at Cardiff University. 
Norman Doe is the Director of the Centre for Law and Religion at Cardiff Law School.  
1
 Part 5 includes provisions affecting, inter alia, the law on pornography, data protection offences, the 
use of reasonable force in self defence.  It also expands the offence of stirring up religious hatred found 
in part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 to include hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.  
2
 See, eg A. Denning, Freedom Under the Law (London: Stevens, 1949) 46: ‘the offence of blasphemy 
is a dead letter’. 
3
 Writing in 2005, Ahdar and Leigh commented how the offence ‘has lingered on, enjoying a perilous 
existence on a life support machine while legislators, commentators and judges huddle around the 
bedside debating whether it has a future’: R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal 
State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 368. 
4
 The popular and academic coverage of the abolition of the blasphemy laws has been much more 
muted than the coverage concerning the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.  
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THE STRANGE LIFE OF BLASPHEMY 
Blasphemers were originally dealt with by the Church Courts; it was not until the 
seventeenth century that the law was enforced by the secular criminal courts.   The 
rationale for the offence is clearly elucidated in one of the earliest cases heard by the 
criminal courts: Taylor’s Case.5  In that case it was established that blasphemy was 
akin to treason: the Chief Justice of the day held that Taylor’s cry that ‘Jesus Christ 
was a bastard, an impostor and a cheat’ was ‘not only an offence to God and to 
religion, but a crime against the laws, state and Government’.   He reasoned that to 
undermine religion was ‘to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies 
are preserved’; since ‘Christianity is parcel of the Laws of England’, it followed that 
‘to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law’.6   However, 
since the law of blasphemy rested, in the main, on decisions made by courts in the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries,7 it was often difficult to determine the exact 
scope of the law.8  That said, despite what one academic called the offence’s 
                                                 
5
 (1676) 1 Vent 293.  
6
 See House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Volume I - 
Report (2003), Volume I, Appendix 3, para 2. 
7
 Blasphemy was originally both a statutory and a common law offence.  It is now only an offence at 
common law: the Criminal Law Act 1967 repealed the Blasphemy Act 1697. 
8
 See, eg, House of Lords Select Committee, n 6 above, Appendix 3, paragraph 1; A. Bradney, 
Religions, Rights and the Law (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) 82; D. Feldman, Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 913. 
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 71(6) Modern Law Review 971-986. 
 3 
‘chameleon-like’ capacity to adapt to changed social conditions,9 it was possible to 
outline the essence of the offence.10  
 
The actus reus of blasphemy was to publish ‘blasphemous’ material in any form.11   
To be ‘blasphemous’, the content of the material had to be both in conflict with the 
tenets of the Church of England and couched in indecent or offensive terms likely to 
shock and outrage the feelings of the general body of Church of England believers.  
The extent to which the law protected Christian denominations other than the Church 
of England was an open question. Indeed, by the nineteenth century judicial 
pronouncements were becoming increasingly confused.  In Gathercole’s Case12, for 
instance, it was noted that a person could lawfully attack ‘any sect of the Christian 
Religion (save the established religion of the country)’ because the Church of England 
alone is ‘the form established by law, and is therefore a part of the constitution of the 
country’.  However, the judgment continued to state that ‘any general attack on 
Christianity is the subject of criminal prosecution, because Christianity is the 
established religion of the country’.13   Nevertheless, as it was made clear in 
                                                 
9
 C Munro, ‘Prophets, Presbyters and Profanity’ [1989] PL  369 at 371 
10
 See, eg P W Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002) 207-
211. 
11
 ‘Blasphemous’ material could be published in a written or verbal form. 
12
 (1838) 2 Lewin 237. 
13
 See also Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law which defined blasphemous matters as those ‘relating 
to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formulation of the Church of England as by law established’: 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1950) article 2.14, quoted by the House of Lords in R v Lemon, R v Gay 
News [1979] AC 617.  
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Williams14, other Christian denominations and other religions were protected ‘to the 
extent that their fundamental beliefs are those which are held in common with the 
established Church.’15  In Williams, a publication attacking Old Testament was not 
interpreted merely as an attack upon Judaism. It was rather held that the ‘Old 
Testament is so connected with the New that it was impossible that such a publication 
as this could be uttered without reflecting upon Christianity itself’.  Other religious 
groups, Christian or not, were protected ‘to the extent that their beliefs overlapped 
with those of the Church of England.’16 
 
The second limb of the definition of ‘blasphemous’ material was important: the 
material must be couched in indecent or offensive terms likely to shock and outrage 
the feelings of the general body of Church of England believers.17  In R v Gott 18 the 
                                                 
14
 (1797) 26 St Tr 654. 
15
 R v Chief Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 QB 429. 
16
 House of Lords Select Committee , n 6 above, Volume 1, Appendix 3, para 4.   
17
 This requirement seems slacker than the criterion that needs to be met in discrimination law before a 
religious group can benefit from an exemption from generally applicable laws.  Under Regulation 7(3) 
of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1661), for example,  there 
is an exemption where the employment is for purposes of an organised religion: such an employer can 
apply  a requirement related to sexual orientation either to comply with the doctrines of the religion, or  
because of the nature of the employment and the context in which it is carried out, so as to avoid 
conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s 
followers.  The employer can discriminate either where the employee does not meet the requirement 
imposed or where the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for him not 
to be satisfied, that that person meets it.  See R Sandberg and N Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in 
Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66(2) Cambridge Law Journal 302. 
18
 (1922) 16 CR App R 87. 
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selling of a newspaper that described Jesus as entering Jerusalem ‘like a circus clown 
on the back of two donkeys’ was held blasphemous on the basis that the passages 
were ‘equally offensive to anyone in sympathy with the Christian religion, whether he 
be a strong Christian, or a lukewarm Christian, or merely a person sympathising with 
their ideas’.19  This requirement did mean however, that the offence of blasphemy did 
‘not protect religious beliefs as such’ but rather was ‘concerned with attacks on those 
beliefs expressed in highly offensive ways.’20  The mere publication of a self 
confessed anti-Christian work,21 and the registration of a company promoting the 
principle that human conduct should be based upon natural knowledge and not 
supernatural belief,22 were thus not caught by the blasphemy law.  Decent and 
reasonable criticism was not blasphemous.  These decisions questioned, however, the 
original rationale of the offence since it was made clear that ‘if the decencies of 
controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked’23 and 
that ‘reasonable men do not apprehend the dissolution or the downfall of society 
because religion is publicly assailed by methods not scandalous’.24   
 
The mens rea of the offence was only firmly established in the last successful 
prosecution.  The House of Lords in R v Lemon, R v Gay News25 held that the 
                                                 
19
 Interestingly the references here are to ‘Christianity’ rather than the ‘Church of England’.  
20
 R Ahdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2005, Oxford) 367.  See also Stephen’s 
Digest of the Criminal Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1950) article 2.14. 
21
 R v Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox CC 231. 
22
 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
23
 R v Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox CC 231. 
24
 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
25
 [1979] AC 617. 
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defendant must have intended to publish the blasphemous material. There was no 
requirement that the defendant had an intention to blaspheme;26 it was sufficient for 
the prosecution to prove that the publication had been intentional and that the matter 
was blasphemous.  The Gay News case was the first successful prosecution for almost 
sixty years.27   During that period, blasphemy was policed extra-legally; it was 
curtailed ‘by the fears, anxieties and sensitivities of individuals’:28 copies of Siné’s 
Massacre, a French cartoonist's book of anti-clerical cartoons (some of which had a 
sexual theme) were burned; permission to film in Britain a motion picture entitled The 
Many Faces of Jesus concerning Jesus’ sex life was denied; and Mary Whitehouse led 
a campaign against Monty Python’s Life of Brian.29  A similar moral panic led to the  
Gay News case itself:30  in 1979 Mary Whitehouse brought a private prosecution 
against the editor and publishers of Gay News alleging that the publication of the 
poem ‘The Love That Dares to Speak its Name’, by James Kirkup with illustrations 
was blasphemous.31  The Gay News case showed that the blasphemy laws remained 
very much alive.  
                                                 
26
 P W Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002 ) 209-210. 
27
 Since R v Gott (1922) 16 CR App R 87. 
28
 See R Webster, A Brief History of Blasphemy (Southwold: Orwell Press, 1990) chapter 1. 
29
 See R Hewison, Monty Python: The Case Against (London: Eyre NMethuen Ltd, 1981) 66-67. 
30
 In 1972, Whitehouse had failed in her private prosecution against the BBC for transmitting an 
episode of Till Death Do Us Part in which Alf Garnett was disparaging on the subject of the virgin 
birth.  The Director of Public Prosecutions decided that the case was unlikely to succeed due to the 
constitutional position of the BBC: see: R Hewison, Monty Python: The Case Against (London: Eyre 
NMethuen Ltd, 1981 60. 
31
 The poem described acts of fellatio and sodomy committed on Christ’s body immediately after his 
death.  It also suggested that Jesus had committed promiscuous homosexual practices with the 
Disciples and other men.    
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The Gay News case also showed that the law on blasphemy was compliant with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  Although the ECHR safeguards 
both freedom of religion (Article 9) and freedom of expression (Article 10), 
Strasbourg has held that the freedom to manifest religion does not include a right to 
be exempt from all criticism32 and freedom of expression contains ‘a duty to avoid 
expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and profane’.33   It was therefore 
unsurprising that the editor and publisher of Gay News were unsuccessful in 
petitioning Strasbourg. The European Commission of Human Rights found that the 
application was manifestly ill-founded and declared the application inadmissible.34 
The Commission held that the common law offence of blasphemous libel constituted 
a restriction to freedom of expression but that restriction was justified in order to 
protect the religious feelings of citizens, legitimate and was necessary in a democratic 
society provided the principle of proportionality is respected.35  Subsequent 
                                                 
32
 İA v Turkey (Application no. 42571/98) 13 September 2005, para 28: ‘Those who choose to exercise 
the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious 
majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate 
and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines 
hostile to their faith.’ 
33
 İA v Turkey (Application no. 42571/98) 13 September 2005, para 24. 
34
 Gay News Ltd v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR. 123. 
35
 The failure of the Article 10 claim was also fatal for the Article 9 claim since interference would be 
justified under Article 9 (2) on the same grounds as under Article 10 (2).   An argument on grounds of 
Article 14 (discrimination in the enjoyment of a Convention right) was also dismissed since there was 
no evidence that the applicants were discriminated against on account of their homosexual views or of 
beliefs not shared by confessing Christians.  
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judgments by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to other States 
followed the same approach.36 
 
Following the Gay News case, it seemed that the offence of blasphemy was 
experiencing something of a revival.  The public order disturbances following the 
publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses37 led to a claim for judicial 
review in the High Court.38   This was refused on the grounds that the common law 
offence of blasphemy applied only to the Christian religion and there was no 
justification for a court to extend this, not least since this was likely to do more harm 
than good.  A subsequent Strasbourg was declared inadmissible.39  The blasphemy 
law was also enforced by the decision-making of public bodies:  for example, the 
                                                 
36
 See eg Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34 in which the Court (but not the 
Commission) held that the seizing of a satirical religious film, Council in Heaven, before it could be 
shown did not breach the filmmaker’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression since the interference 
was prescribed by law, had a legitimate aim in protecting the Convention rights of others and was 
necessary in a democratic society given the pressing social need to ensure religious peace in that region 
and was proportionate in that authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation.  
37
 The fictional novel tells the story of two men: one of whom is divided between his attraction to life 
in the East and his attraction to life in the West; the other is divided between his desire to believe in 
God and his inability to believe in God.  The first man survives by returning to the East; the second is 
unable to return to his religious beliefs and finally kills himself.  The novel includes disparaging 
references to God, Abraham, Muhammad and the teachings of Islam.   
38
 R v Chief Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 QB 429. 
39
 Choudhury v United Kingdom (1991) 12 HRLJ 172.   The Applicant applied to European 
Commission of Human Rights on grounds of violation of Articles 9 and 14.  The Commission 
dismissed the claim on the grounds that ‘no State authority or any body under which the United 
Kingdom Government may be responsible under the Convention, directly interfered in the applicant’s 
freedom to manifest his religion or belief’.  
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British Board of Film Classification has refused to grant films a certificate on the 
ground that their content was blasphemous.  Again, this was upheld by Strasbourg:40  
the refusal to issue a certificate for Wingrove’s Visions of Ecstasy41 was prescribed by 
law, had a legitimate aim in protecting the rights of others, was necessary in a 
democratic society given that the film made serious offensive attacks on matters 
regarded sacred by Christians, and was proportionate given the ‘high threshold of 
profanation embodied in the definition of the offence’ of blasphemy.42   In addition to 
the use of the blasphemy laws by public authorities, the high profile of the Gay News 
case meant that the offence was also invariably policed in offence by means of self-
censorship. 
THE DEATH OF BLASPHEMY 
The ‘high threshold of profanation’ elucidated by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Wingrove v United Kingdom and the lack of a successful prosecution since 
1979 could be interpreted as meaning that the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 was hasty in that the lack of court action was a sign of the success of the law not 
of its weakness.  An alternative interpretation, however, is that the Gay News case 
was the exception to the rule that the offence was moribund; the fact that the ‘The 
                                                 
40
 Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR. 
41
 The eighteen minutes long silent film was derived from the life and writings of St Teresa of Avila, a 
sixteenth century nun who experienced ecstatic visions of Christ.   The film showed scenes of a sexual 
nature juxtaposed with images of Christ fastened to the Cross.  The film ends with St Teresa kissing 
and licking the body of Christ, and placing her hand in his which he then holds.  
42
 Compare the decision of the Commission who held that the interference was not necessary in a 
democratic society. The total ban was disproportionate. Since the film was a video rather than 
cinematic release, it was unlikely to be displayed to general public. Its short length meant conscious 
decision to view was required so no there was pressing social need.   
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Love That Dares to Speak its Name’ had been broadcast on BBC television43 and 
recited publicly without prosecution44 means that the offence of blasphemy was dead 
long before the formal recognition of its demise by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008.  
 
A cursory examination supports this latter view. Since 1979, numerous commentators 
and politicians called for the offence to be abolished.45 For example, in 1981, the Law 
Commission proposed abolition,46 while in 2001, the then Home Secretary David 
Blunkett told the House of Commons that the Government’s position was that ‘There 
is a good case for revising and, indeed, removing existing blasphemy law’.47  
However, a more detailed analysis of the events of the last ten years suggests a more 
nuanced conclusion.   Five developments need to be examined in turn:  the 1999 
decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland that a prosecution crime of blasphemy could 
not succeed in Ireland,48 the work and findings of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales in 2003, the enactment of the 
                                                 
43
 During the course of the BBC 2 television programme Taboo (broadcast 12.12.01), the text and 
cartoon drawing published in Gay News was shown on the screen while Joan Bakewell read out a 
section of the poem.  The response from the BBC’s Head of Programme Complaints Unit was that this 
‘was responsible and appropriate to the subject matter and the inclusion of part of the poem was 
justified.  [The] change in public attitudes over time has extended the degree of tolerance’. 
44
 In 2002, a group from the National Secular Society arranged a public recitation of ‘The Love That 
Dares to Speak its Name’ to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the prosecution.  Advanced 
notice was provided in the press.  Again, there was no police action.   
45
 N. Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (London: Routledge, 2007) 124. 
46
 Law Commission.(1981).  Offences against Religion and Public Worship (Working Paper No. 79). 
47
 David Blunkett, HC Deb Column 707 26 Nov 2001. 
48
 Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [1999] 4 IR 484. 
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Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 , a 2007 High Court decision concerning Jerry 
Springer: the Opera,49  and, finally, the parliamentary history of section 79(1) of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.  These developments are critical to an 
understanding of the reasons for the abolition of the blasphemy offences in 2008.  
 
The abolition of blasphemy in Ireland 
In Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd, proceedings were brought in 
relation to a cartoon published in the Sunday Independent which it was claimed 
treated the sacrament of the Eucharist and its administration as objects of scorn and 
derision.  The allegation of blasphemy required the court to examine the evolution of 
the crime of blasphemy in England and then its evolution in Ireland.  Although the 
Irish Constitution states that ‘The publication or utterance of blasphemous... matter is 
an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law’,50 blasphemy is 
undefined by the Constitution and Irish law.  The Supreme Court concluded that that a 
prosecution crime of blasphemy could not succeed in Ireland for three related reasons.  
The first reason was the wording of the Irish Constitution:51 it was debatable if the 
‘secular’ Constitution carried over the English law on blasphemy and even if it did, it 
was questionable whether that law was compatible with Article 44.1 which places the 
duty on the State to respect and honour religion as such meaning that the State’s ‘only 
                                                 
49
 Green v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2785. 
50
 Article 40.6(1)(i). 
51
 On which, generally see P Colton, ‘Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal 
Cooperation of State and Religions in Ireland’ in R. Puza and N. Doe (eds), Religion and Law in 
Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2006). 
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function is to protect public order and morality’.52  The second reason was the 
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1871.  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
since the English law of blasphemy only protected the Church of England as the 
‘established Church’ it is was difficult to see how the common law crime of 
blasphemy, could survive in such a different constitutional framework.53  The third 
reason was legal uncertainty: the Court held that in the absence of any legislative 
definition of the constitutional offence of blasphemy, it was ‘impossible to say of 
what the offence of blasphemy consists’ since neither the actus reus nor the mens rea 
is clear.    
 
These objections, however, are questionable.  The first reason seems to be 
undermined by the Constitutional reference to blasphemy and seems contrary to the 
Strasbourg case law: there is no legal basis to say that a religious protection 
constitutional clause means that there can be no offence of blasphemy.  The second 
reason seems incorrect in law: even if it is assumed that the offence protects the 
Church of England only as opposed to Christianity generally, Williams establishes 
that the offence of blasphemy protects other Christian denominations to the extent that 
their beliefs overlap with the established Church.  It follows that the disestablishment 
of the Church of Ireland is as irrelevant as the disestablishment of the Church in 
Wales. 54  The third reason is contrary to the Strasbourg case law which has 
consistently held that the English prohibition against blasphemy is ‘prescribed by law’ 
                                                 
52
 Corway v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [1999] 4 IR 484 [31], [34].  
53
 Ibid [35].  
54
 The Welsh position is buttressed further by the fact that England and Wales share the same criminal 
law jurisdiction.  For a contrary view, see N. Addison, n45 above, 123. 
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and is not in breach of the legal certainty requirements of Article 7 ECHR.  Although 
the Irish Supreme Court declined to follow the Gay News case, 55  there was nothing 
preventing the Irish Court from reviewing the same centuries-old authorities as the 
House of Lords to reach the identical conclusion that the mens rea of the offence was 
certain.   However, despite its flaws, the importance of the Irish Supreme Court’s 
decision on the mainland should not be under-emphasized.  In particular, Corway cast 
a long shadow upon the deliberations of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Religious Offences in England and Wales in 2003. 
 
Select Committee on Religious Offences  
Established ‘to consider and report on the law relating to religious offences’, the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales 
identified two main strands of their inquiry: whether existing religious offences 
(notably blasphemy) should be amended or abolished and whether a new offence of 
incitement to religious hatred should be created and, if so, how.56  Although the 
Report was light in terms of definite conclusions, it did note that there was a gap in 
the law and seemed reluctant to see blasphemy filling that gap.  The Report concluded 
that the future of the common law offence of blasphemy ‘may not depend upon 
legislation but upon the contemporary climate, both social and legal, which could lead 
to a decision to take no action at all’.57  The Report also expressed the view that the 
offence of blasphemy was a dead-letter, contending that ‘any prosecution for 
                                                 
55
 n 52 above [31].  
56
 House of Lords Select Committee , n 6 above, chapter 1, para 1.  
57
 Ibid, para 139. 
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blasphemy today … is likely to fail on grounds either of discrimination or denial of 
the right to freedom of expression’.58    
 
The Report made three distinct contentions in this respect.  First, the report contended 
that the Wingrove decision that blasphemy was in the UK’s ‘margin of appreciation’ 
does not mean that it will continue to be Convention compatible: ‘the Court’s decision 
in Wingrove that there was not ‘as yet…sufficient common accord’ to mean that the 
English law of blasphemy was in breach of the European Convention does not mean 
that it will not rule otherwise in the future’.59  Second, the common law is uncertain in 
relation to whether the offence applies to the Church of England or Christianity.  This 
means that the law is not compatible with Article 7 ECHR.60   The third contention 
was that the discrimination against non-Christian faiths and the dis-proportionality of 
the unlimited penalty may cause problems.  The Report pointed out that these factors 
had not been in point in any of the Strasbourg cases so far and domestic courts have to 
give a definite ruling, unlike Strasbourg which can lean on its ‘margin of 
appreciation’.61 
                                                 
58
 Ibid, Appendix, para 9.  
59
 Ibid, Appendix 3, para 12. 
60
 In Wingrove, ‘counsel for both sides presented a united front that Lord Scarman’s speech in the Gay 
News case had defined the actus reus of blasphemy in common law’.  This was questionable especially 
since in Wingrove the British Board of Film Classification adopted a definition of blasphemy but 
omitting any reference to the Church of England: In Wingrove, ‘counsel for both sides presented a 
united front that Lord Scarman’s speech in the Gay News case had defined the actus reus of blasphemy 
in common law’.  This was questionable especially since in Wingrove the British Board of Film 
Classification adopted a definition of blasphemy but omitting any reference to the Church of England 
61
 House of Lords Select Committee , n 6 above, appendix 3, para 15. 
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This reasoning is similar to but more nuanced than that in Corway.  The first 
contention boarders on the farcical since if taken to its logical conclusion it would call 
into question every pronouncement by Strasbourg. Although it is true that the ECHR 
is a living instrument and that its interpretation will change over time, it seems 
disingenuous to speculate in the light of a clear judicial statement that Strasbourg 
would perform a volte-face in the short-term. The second contention is also 
questionable on practical grounds: ‘To date the English courts have taken a very 
narrow view of the protection afforded by Article 7 and have failed to accept that 
common law crimes such as manslaughter by gross negligence and public nuisance 
are incompatible with Article 7 on the grounds of their vagueness’.62  The third reason 
seems contrary to Strasbourg case law, particularly Choudhury v United Kingdom63: 
the Article 14 prohibition on discrimination is not a free-standing right;64 there must 
be breach of another Convention Article.  The decision in Choudhury v United 
Kingdom, coupled with the current unwillingness of English courts to accept 
                                                 
62
 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2005) 20. 
63
 (1991) 12 HRLJ 172. 
64
 Article 1 of Protocol 12 extends this to ‘any right set forth by law’ but this has not been ratified in 
the UK.  See R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 109. 
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interference with Article 9,65 suggests that it is unlikely that an English court would 
declare the blasphemy laws incompatible with the Convention.66  
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006  
The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 amended the Public Order Act 1986 to 
create Part 3A entitled ‘Hatred against persons on religious grounds’.67  The Act, in 
the words of section 1, ‘creates offences involving stirring up hatred against persons 
on religious grounds’.  It creates numerous criminal offences protecting groups of 
believers from being threatened in a way that is defined by reference to religious 
belief or lack of religious belief.68    However, contrary to Government’s original 
intentions, a prosecution can only be brought if the defendant intended to stir up 
                                                 
65
 On which see M. Hill and R. Sandberg, ‘Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ 
[2007] PL 488 and R. Sandberg, ‘Controversial Recent Claims to Religious Liberty’ (2008) 124 LQR 
213. 
66
 There is also some evidence of an emergence of a domestic margin of appreciation, on which R (on 
the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] EWCA Civ 297, at 
paras 31-33 per Laws LJ, and [2003] UKHL 23, at para 132 per Lord Nicholls: as commented upon by 
M. Hill, ‘Freedom of Expression: Defining the Limits for Broadcasters’ (2004) 7 Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 466; and R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School  [2006] UKHL 16 at para 36, per Lord Bingham: and para 64 per Lord Hoffmann: as 
commented upon by M. Hill and R. Sandberg,  ‘Muslim Dress in English Law: Lifting the Veil on 
Human Rights’ (2006) 1 Religión y Derecho (Law and Religion) 302. 
67
  For an account of the Act’s extraordinary legislative history, see N. Addison, n 45 above, 139-141. 
68
 For a full account, see I. Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to 
Religious Hatred’ [2006] PL 521; and K. Goodall, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No 
Substance’ (2007) 70(1) MLR 89. 
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religious hatred.69    This, coupled with a freedom of speech clause included in the 
final Act,70 has decreased the likelihood of a successful prosecution under the Act.71   
 
The focus of the new law differs from that of the law on blasphemy.72  Unlike the law 
of blasphemy, which seeks to protect Christian religious beliefs as a source of public 
morality and social cohesion, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 simply seeks 
to outlaw antisocial behaviour committed against people on grounds of religion.  The 
protection extends far beyond the sensibilities of the established church: indeed, the 
protection is not focused on ‘religion’ as such but rather upon deviant acts that happen 
to involve ‘religion’.  Although some commentators have seen aspects of the Act as 
possible replacements for the law on blasphemy,73 and this was the original stated 
intent of the Government,74 at Report Stage,75 the House of Lords voted down an 
amendment to abolish the law on blasphemy by 153 votes to 113. 
                                                 
69
 The Government had wanted the offence to be charged either when the defendant had the intention to 
stir up religious hatred or was being reckless as to whether religious hatred would be stirred up thereby.  
The Government had also wanted to include ‘abusive or insulting’ words or behaviour in addition to 
‘threatening’. 
70
 Section 29J .  
71
 See A. Jeremy ‘Practical Implications of the Enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006’ 
(2007) 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 187. 
72
 See R. Sandberg, ‘Religion and Morality: A Socio-Legal Approach’ [2007] DISKUS (online). 
73
 See N. Addison, , n 45 above, 133. 
74
 See the comments of David Blunkett, n above 47. 
75
 8th November 2005.  As Lord Avebury noted this was simply the latest in a long line of debates 
concerning the future of the offence, including debates surrounding the Blasphemy (Abolition) Bill of 
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At Report Stage, Lord Averbury’s arguments supporting his amendment to abolish 
blasphemy echoed those of the Irish Supreme Court and the Select Committee.  
However, in addition to the well-rehearsed arguments concerning legal certainty, 
discrimination against other faiths and incompatibility with Article 10 ECHR,76 two 
further arguments were advanced.  First, that the enactment of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act without the abolition of blasphemy would lead to ‘confusion 
between incitement to hatred of believers and hatred of beliefs themselves’ (since the 
Act only forbade the former);77 and second, that the law on blasphemy should be 
abolished because of the low level of mens rea required for a blasphemy prosecution 
(simply an intention to publish).78  It was this first argument that other peers rejected: 
rather than opposing the abolition of blasphemy, successive speakers questioned 
whether it was the right time and the right Bill for such an amendment.79 Although 
their lordships noted that there was ‘broad consensus outside the House for change’,80 
the amendment fell largely because the Church of England Bishops had given ‘a red 
                                                                                                                                            
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004 and at Second Reading of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Bill itself: HL Hansard, Column 520 8 Nov 2005 
76
 Ibid, Columns 521-522. 
77
 Ibid, column 521. 
78
 Ibid, column 522. 
79
 See eg ‘If religious hatred is nothing to do with blasphemy, let the two be dealt with separately’: the 
then Lord Bishop of Oxford, ibid column 52; ‘it would be totally wrong to move forward with the 
clause as it stands at this stage when there will be no proper opportunity to consider the wider 
implications’: Lord Crickhowell, ibid column 528.  Baroness O’Cathain’s contribution (at ibid 
Columns 532-533) is an exception to this overall picture.  
80
 Baroness Whitaker, ibid column 535.  
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signal to [the] amendment but a green signal to the principle’;81 the conclusion was 
simply ‘not in this Bill’.82  The question following the debate and the astonishing final 
parliamentary stages of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was how long the 
abolition of blasphemy was to stay in the political long grass.  
 
Jerry Springer: the Court Case    
Although the furore surrounding the television transmission of Jerry Springer: the 
Opera in 2005 cast attention on the relationship between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion,83  it was the resulting litigation almost two years later that 
focussed attention upon the existence and future of the blasphemy law.  In Green v 
The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court84 a member of Christian Voice sought to 
bring a private prosecution for blasphemous libel against the producer of Jerry 
Springer: the Opera and the Director General of the BBC.  When the District Judge 
sitting in the Magistrates Court refused to issue a summons on the grounds that 
prosecution was prevented by the Theatres Act 1968 and in any case there was no 
                                                 
81
 Lord Hunt of Wirral, ibid column 539.  
82
 Baroness Scotland of Asthal, ibid Column 540. 
83
 The BBC received a record 55,000 complaints before transmission and 8,000 further complaints post 
transmission. Many Commentators, including BBC News, attributed this high volume of complaints to 
an orchestrated campaign by various Christian groups – such as Christian Voice and The Christian 
Institute.  Christian Voice published the home addresses of several BBC executives on their website 
which led to one executive receiving death threats and having to leave their home for a while to protect 
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prima facie case,85  Green applied for a judicial review, seeking a mandatory order 
requiring the issue of the summons  
 
The High Court refused the application. Hughes LJ, giving the judgment of the court, 
noted that, although it very rarely invoked, the offence of blasphemous libel still 
existed.  The law could be accurately stated and was Convention compliant since 
interference with freedom of expression is permitted under Article 10(2) and there 
would not normally be an interference with that Article 9 rights since the right to hold 
and practise a religion was generally unaffected by such insults.  These findings 
undermined much of the reasoning of the Irish Supreme Court, the House of Lords 
select committee and the House of Lords debate on the Racial and Religious Act, 
which assumed that the blasphemy laws would not be compatible with the ECHR.  
 
However, the two grounds upon which the High Court refused the judicial review 
provided a more cogent rationale for abolishing the offence.  First, the High Court 
held that the District Judge was right to refuse the summons on the basis that section 
2(4) of the Theatres Act 1968 prevented prosecution.  The Act states that  
‘No person shall be proceeded against in respect of a performance of a play or 
anything said or done in the course of such a performance … for an offence at 
common law where it is of the essence of the offence that the performance or, as the 
case may be what was said or done was obscene, indecent, offensive, disgusting or 
injurious to morality’.  The High Court held that this applied to the offence of 
blasphemy, which was a common law offence, the essence of which was such 
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offensiveness as to endanger a threat to society in general.    Although the Theatres 
Act 1968 did not apply to the broadcast by the BBC, the Broadcasting Act 1990,86 
contained provisions identical to those in the Theatres Act applicable to broadcasts.  
 
Second, the High Court found that the District Judge has not erred in her finding that 
there was no prima facie case to answer.  Rejecting the claim that previous 
unsuccessful challenges in respect of Jerry Springer: the Opera had led the judge to 
fetter her discretion, 87  the High Court held that the District Judge had been entitled 
to conclude that the play as a whole was not and could not reasonably be regarded as 
aimed at Christianity or at what Christians held sacred.  It was apparent from the 
claimant’s own description of the work (and confirmed by the Court’s own brief 
viewing of a recording) that the target of Jerry Springer: the Opera was ‘the tasteless 
“confessional” chat show, rather than the Christian religion’88.  Moreover, there was 
no evidence before the District Judge justifying a finding of prima facie damage to 
society or of the risk of civil strife. Since the facts were not in dispute, her conclusion 
was within the range of decisions properly open to her.    
                                                 
86
 Schedule 15 paragraph 6. 
87
 The claimant had contended that the she had fettered her discretion by treating the issue before her as 
being concluded by two previous findings of other bodies in relation to the play: in R (the Christian 
Institute) v BBC c/1378/2005, Crane J had dismissed a judicial review into the decision to broadcast the 
production on the basis that submissions contending a breach of the Corporation’s Charter and Article 
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her as a decision for anyone but herself. There was no sign that she had placed too much weight upon 
these decisions but in any event, weight was a matter for the primary decision-maker, not for the High 
Court.  
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The High Court thus undermined many of the human-rights based reasons given for 
the need to abolish blasphemy.  However, in their place, it added two new dimensions 
to the debate.  The significant curtailing of the blasphemy law by the Theatres Act 
1968 coupled with the recognition of the high threshold that needed to be proved, 
including evidence of societal damage moved the debate on.  It is quite extraordinary 
that the impact of the Theatres Act 1968 was previously ignored in the debate 
concerning whether the blasphemy offences should be abolished: it is not mentioned, 
for example, in the report by the House of Lords Select Committee. This, in itself, 
however, did not mean that abolition was inevitable since the demanding 
requirements of the actus reus of the offence had long been recognised. 89  Perhaps, 
more important, was the High Court’s insistence that the offence of blasphemy was 
alive and could still be elucidated.  Although Green v The City of Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court  revealed that the potential for a blasphemy prosecution was 
small, it also served as a reminder that the offence lay dormant rather than dead and 
could in special circumstances be revived in much the same way as it was in the Gay 
News case.  Although the House of Lords refused to hear the case judicially, it was 
not to be long before Parliament dealt with the offence of blasphemy yet again.   
 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
On 9 January 2008 on the floor of the House of Commons, Dr Evan Harris moved a 
new clause to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill to abolish what he called ‘the 
ancient discriminatory, unnecessary, illiberal and non-human rights compliant 
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offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel’.90  In addition to the usual criticisms 
concerning legal uncertainty, discrimination and alleged incompatibility with the 
ECHR,91 which Dr Harris elucidated without reference to Green v The City of 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court,92 a number of further arguments were advanced.   Dr 
Harris claimed that the blasphemy law was unnecessary: there were ‘enough laws 
dealing with outraging public decency and public order offences are already on the 
statute book to ensure that the removal of these two offences will not lead to 
widespread outrageous behaviour in public’. 93  Moreover, and particularly tellingly 
given the recent comments of the High Court, Dr Harris contended that abolition was 
required because although the law had not been used for a long time, it had ‘a chilling 
effect’, leading to self-censorship.94  Referencing the objections to abolishing 
blasphemy at the time of debating the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, Dr Harris 
argued that there was no longer ‘an excuse for prevarication’ since ‘religious hatred 
was dealt with two years ago’.95 
 
                                                 
90
 HC Hansard, Column 442 9 Jan 2008 
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 Ibid, Column 443.  
92
 Reference to the case was made, however, by Nick Herbert, who commented that ‘it is hard to 
understand how any prosecution under the blasphemy laws could succeed when that action did not’: 
Ibid, Column 451. 
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 Ibid, Column 443.  
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However, Dr Harris was persuaded of the virtues of prevarication, withdrawing his 
new clause in response to an undertaking by the Government to bring forward its own 
new clause to the like effect in the Lords, subject to a satisfactory outcome to 
consultations with the Church of England.96  The Government relied heavily on Green 
v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to reach its conclusion that it was ‘high 
time that Parliament reached a settled conclusion on the issue’:97 they contended that 
the decision in Green concerning the Theatres Act reinforced the idea that the 
offences appear to be moribund. 98   On 5th March 2008, an amendment abolishing 
blasphemy was moved by the Government in the House of Lords.99  The 
Government’s reasons for the amendment were said to be two-fold: first, since the law 
‘has fallen into disuse’, this ‘runs the risk of bringing the law as a whole into 
disrepute’; second, there is now ‘new legislation to protect individuals on the grounds 
of religion and belief’.100  This first reason seems questionable: whilst it is true that 
there had been no prosecutions since 1979; the Green decision surely showed that the 
law was being used.101  The Government was on far steadier ground in relation to its 
second reason:102 although Green showed that blasphemy still existed, it showed that 
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the offences had been severely curtailed.  The amendment was passed by 148 votes to 
87 by the House of Lords and then by 378 votes to 57 in the House of Commons. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: THE AFTER LIFE OF BLASPHEMY 
The move against the laws on blasphemy was characterised by evolution not 
revolution.  Although the well-rehearsed arguments based on the Human Rights Act 
were specious, as the High Court judgment in Green v The City of Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court confirmed, they nevertheless built up the momentum began by the 
Law Commission’s early call for the abolishment of the offence.  The High Court 
judgment in Green was especially important in noting despite the amputation of the 
offence by the Theatres Act and the significant thresholds that needed to be overcome 
prior to prosecution, the offence of blasphemy still existed.  Although the offence was 
largely symbolic, it was not completely symbolic.  
 
This realisation suggests that the death knell of blasphemy was sounded not by the 
Irish Supreme Court, the House of Lords Select Committee, the enactment of the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act or by the High Court in Green.  Rather, the death 
knell was sounded by Mary Whitehouse over thirty years ago.  The Gay News case, in 
showing that a prosecution for blasphemy could succeed, demonstrated that the 
blasphemy laws had teeth; they were not merely historical symbols of the country’s 
organic constitution and religious heritage.  The High Court in Green, unlike the Irish 
Supreme Court in Corway and the House of Lords Select Committee, accepted this 
                                                                                                                                            
religious hatred and discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief—in the provision of goods, 
services and employment—do.’ 
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and held in obiter that the law was ECHR compliant.  Ironically, it was the very 
finding that blasphemy was not dead that proved to be fatal.  
 
It is not the case that section 79(1) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
has resulted in legal clarity.  The abolition of blasphemy leaves untouched other areas 
of the criminal law affecting religious beliefs and believers.  Some of the same 
criticism made of the blasphemy laws can now be made in respect of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006: the neutering of the Act by the House of Lords, regardless 
of the merits of such actions, has resulted in a law of largely symbolic importance.   
Furthermore, the growth in pubic order offences has led to the creation of a plethora 
of other criminal offences affecting religion.  In addition to numerous cases 
concerning religion relying on the general provisions of the Public Order Act 1986, 103 
prosecutions have been made under the common law offence of breach of the peace104 
and under the Protection from the Harassment Act 1997,105  in addition to the use of 
Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOS).106  Since 2001, the criminal law has 
recognised that the sentence for specific crimes may be increased if that crime is 
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racially or religiously aggravated.107 This applies to the law on assault, criminal 
damage, public order offences and offences under the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997. 108   Moreover a number of statutory provisions, enacted in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries,109 which protected religious worship and fettered 
freedom of expression, remain operative.110   The criminal law continues to affect 
religion even after the abolition of blasphemy: facts that previously may have resulted 
in a blasphemy prosecution may now be pursued under a range of different pieces of 
legislation.111   
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 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a new category of ‘racially aggravated criminal offences’.  
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Moreover, as the furore concerning the Satanic Verses and more recently the 
Mohammed Cartoons in Jyllands Posten makes only too clear, moral panics 
concerning the clash of freedom of expression and freedom of religion will occur 
even when there is no chance of a successful prosecution.  The lack of legal redress 
may serve to restrict rather than reinforce free speech. Policing blasphemy by public 
pressure is inherently problematic, since the most active pressure groups may not be 
representative of society as a whole.   Fear of ‘obdurate believers’ may lead to greater 
self-censorship than ever before.112  The democratic basis that underpins the law is 
absent in relation to rule by pressure group.  The body of the blasphemy laws may be 
dead but its spirit lives on.  Section 79(1) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 is just one of a number of legislative changes in the last decade to the way in 
which religion is regulated under English law.  Only time will tell how whether these 
changes are successful.   It remains to be seen whether this new law on religion, 
which has replaced a stance of passive tolerance with detailed prescriptive regulation 
guided by active promotion of religious liberty as a right, is a step in the correct 
direction.113 
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